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NOTES.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.

In the case of United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., decided on 'March 27, 19o9, the liability of interstate railroads
2

under the Safety Appliance Act was fully discussed. The
action was brought by the United States against the railroad
company to collect penalties for infractions of the Act. Among
the sections violated was the second, which declares it to be
"unlawful for any such common carrier to haul
* * *
on its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped
with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which
can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between
the ends of the cars."

It was argued for the United States

17o Fed. 542.
2 Mch. 2, 1893, C 196, § 6, 27 Stat. M3.
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that the Act was absolute in its terms, and could be satisfied
only by having all cars so equipped and in working order at all
events. The Court, however, construed this clause as imposing
only a duty to equip the cars with the specified appliances, after
which the law would be satisfied by a compliance with the
Common Law requirement that the utmost diligence be exercised to keep the appliances in repair.
The plaintiffs position, favoring an absolute readirrg of the
Act, has some support,' the decisions going on the ground that
the wording of the statute is plain and the question of hardship or injustice is not for the courts, but for the legislature.*
This interpretation is based on reading the words, "and which
can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between
the ends of the cars," as imposing an independent requirement. It would seem, however, that the interpretation of this
clause in the principal case, as descriptive of the appliance in
question, and not as adding anything to the requirements of
the section is more reasonable. This is the majority view and.
-is amply supported by recognized rules of statutory construction.
The able opinion in Ry. Co. v. Delk 5 first approaches the
subject by inquiring into the purpose of the statute. We find
from the title that the general purposq is to promote the
safety of employis and travellers, and that the immediate
purpose is to compel common carriers to equip their cars with
automatic couplers. The title could not, of course, override the
plain language of the Act itself, but it is legitimate to examine
it in connection therewith,6 and in this case we find that section
two corresponds with what the title has indicated-it requires
that cars be equipped with automatic couplers. In order to
discover just how much of the previous law this requirement
is meant to supersede, the Court in the Delk case then examines
the state of the law before the Act. At that time a number of
types of couplers were in use, chiefly the link and pin variety,
and the Common Law rule of utmost diligence in the inspection
and care of them obtained. The purpose of the Act is fully
accomplished by changing the type of coupler without altering
the law in any other respect.
This reading is still further. supported by the rule ihat a
'Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 28t; U. S. v. Ry., 135 Fed, 12; U. S. v.
Ry., ito Fed. 229.
'Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 4.
t5i8 Fed. 931.
Cha. R. Bridge v. Warren Bridge, it Pet. 420, at p. 611; Endlich,
Interpretation of Statutes, § 58.
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statute in derogation of the previous law, particularly when
it was Common Law, is strictly construed.t Much stress has
been laid also on the rule that when a statute admits of two
constructions, and one imposes a duty impossible to perform,
the other should be preferred. If the Safety Appliance Act
were construed absolutely it would result in a carrier's being
liable for a break or defect that occurred in a car moving between stations, no matter how quickly it was discovered and
remedied ;8 and it has been pointed out that such a rule would
lead to the absurd result that the very act of repairing a defective coupler would make a case and work a forfeiture.$
In support of the majority rule it has also been said that an
unjust construction should be avoided where possible. 10 The
without subjecting
object of the statute is fully accomplished
11
the railroad to the burden of an insurer.
It is to be regretted that the only Supreme Court utterance
on this subject (which, however, is under a different section
and therefore not binding on the Court in the principal case),
is in accord with the absolute construction of the Act. On
principle the doctrine of the principal case would seem to be
preferable.
RE-ENTRY

In a recent

A14D FORFEITURE OF ESTATES ON CONDITION.
Arkansas case t the Court, in an elaborate opin-

ion, held that the grantor of an estate on condition might after
breach of the condition convey the land without re-entry and
that the grantee might enforce the forfeiture for breach of the
condition. This decision is based on two grounds (I) that
the doctrine of livery of seisin does not exist in Arkansas and
(2) that there is no law against maintenance in that state.
(I) The doctrine that an entry, or its equivalent, by the
grantor, or his heir, is necessary before the forfeiture of an
estate for breach of condition can be effected, had its origin
in the theory that, as livery of seisin was necessary for the
creation of a freehold estate, a ceremony of equal solemnity1R. R. v. Brinkmeier, 93 Pac. 621; Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 127.
'U. S. v. Ry., x56 Fed. 182.
U. S. v. Ry., iSo Fed. 442.
Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, § 258; Bishop on Statutory
Crimes, § 8z.
U. S. v. Ry., 156 Fed. 182.
'Moore v. Sharpe, 121 S. W. 341.
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was essential to its termination.' Where, therefore, the doctrine of livery of seisin does not prevail the logical conclusion
is that an entry is unnecessary, and in the United States generally the doctrine prevails that an action of ejectment may
be maintained without proof of entry, either for-the reason
stated above, or on the ground that the confession of entry
involved in the action is sufficient.'
(2) The Common Law rule that conditions cannot be taken
advantage of save by the grantor or his heirs and are therefore
incapable of assignment is of feudal origin, and the reason
thereof was stated by Coke to be "for avoiding of maintenance, suppression of right, and stirring-up of suits."' It is
submitted, however, that this reason applies only to the case
of an assignment after breach of condition, and that the reason
why there can be no assignment before breach is that the
grantor has "only a possibility of reverter,--a naked and very
remote possibility, but nothing that he .could convey to an assignee." 5 In Mass, however, it would seem that the courts
are inclined to give greater substance to the right of entry
before breach of condition. In one case it is said that the
grant of an estate on condition subsequent "leaves in the
grantor a vested right, which by its very nature is reserved
to him as a present exist.ing interest transmissible'to his hei-s."
But the weight of authority holds that-the grantor in such a
case has a bire possibility of reverter, and the cases support
the view that this is the real reason why there can be no
assignment before breach of condition." After breach of condition the grantor has a right to enter or (where entry is unnecessary) a right to bring ejectment, and the test of the transferability of such right must be the existence or non-existence
of the law against maintenance. In the case of McKissick v.
Pickle' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: "The law
against maintenance has never been adopted in this State. The
reason assigned why a condition in England could not be assigned is because no title could be made to land held by another
adversely as that was against the law which forbid miainte*Co. Lilt., 2z4b, T-tt. 1 351.
"Cowell lK Colorado Springs Co., zoo U. S. 55; Austln v. Parish,21

Pick. 21S.

I Co. Lilt., 2r4.
*Nicoll v. R. R., 12

N. Y. 121.
•Church v. Grant, 3 Gray, 142, 14.

'Bethlehem v. Annis, 40 N. H. 34, 45; Bouvier V. R. R., 67 N. J.
016 Pa. 14.

L281.

NOTES

nance. * * * This is a fair case for the application of
the maxim ccssante rationc cessat ipse le-r." In that case the
right of entry for breach of condition was reserved to the assigns in the deed creating the conditional estate, but in New
Jersey, in the case of Boueier v. R. R.0 it was held that this
was not essential. In the course of the opinion in the latter
case the Court said, "I think that in any case wherever the
English law against maintenance is not in force a right of
entry for condition broken should be held transferable. after
breach of the condition. Before breach I think transfer to be
legal must be authorized by legislation."
The results of the foregoing considerations may be summarized as follows:
(i) Where the doctrine of livery of seisin is not in force
there is no necessity .of entry for breach of cohdition.
(2)
Before breach the right of entry for condition broken
is transferable only by statutory authority.
(3) After breach the transferability of the right of entry
depends upon the existence or non-existence of the law against
maintenance.

GAmING CONTRAcTs GOVERNFED BY LEX Locr CONTRACTUS, NOT

BY LEx Foir.

In the case of Saxby v. Fulton' we have an interesting illustration of the attitude of the English courts upon the subject
of loans for gambling purposes. In this case one Brooks and
the plaintiff had been in the habit of together paying annual
visits to Monte Carlo. It was their custom for the plaintiff
to find the whole of the money for the expenses of both, while
Brooks made all, the arrangements and paid the bills out of
money supplied to him for that purpose. Accounts were settled after their return to England, when the expenses of the
trip were shared equally between them, and the balance remaining due from the one to the other was discharged. This
action was brought to recover the balance due plaintiff on
money advanced by him (luring their trips in 19o5 and i9o6.
The greater part of the advances had been used by Brooks for
the purpose of gambling at the roulette tables at Monte Carlo,
roulette being lawful at that place. but unlawful in England by
statute, and the judges assumed that plaintiff knew when he
'67 N. J. L 28f.
'L R. 19o9, ii K B.

2o8.
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advanced it that it was to be used for that purpose. Brooks
paid interest to plaintiff ori the balance due him until his death
but died without repaying the balance due plaintiff. No security had been given for the debt.
It was decided that as the debt was one which was not
illegal in the country where the contract was made and was
not one that the English courts could on grounds of public
policy hold not to be governed by the lex loci contractus, that
it could be enforced in the courts of England. Quarrierv. Colston 2 was held to govern the case under discussion.
The Gaming Act of 1710, inter alia, made void all securities
the consideration for which should for the reimbursing or repaying any money knowingly lent or advanced for gaming at
..cards, dice, tables, tennis, bowls, or other game or g.mes
whatsoever." The Gaming Act of 18353 in order to avoid the
hardship suffered by the innocent indorsee for value or bona
fide holder for value of such paper substituted the provision
that such paper should be deemed to have been given for an
illegal consideration, thus enabling the above mentioned parties
to recover thereon.
The Court in the present case refused to adopt the view that
the security was to be deemed to have been given for an illegal
consideration, not merely for the purpose of relieving the
bona fide holder for value, but for all purposes, and that, therefore, it is not possible to sue upon the consideration. Buckley,
L. J., at page 229 said: "The principal argument before us has
been whether the effect of the Acts of 171o and 1835 is to make
the consideration, as well as the security, void. I do not think
that that is the effect of those statutes." * * *
This view was first taken by Lord Mansfield in Robinson v.
Bland." At page 260 Lord Mansfield says: "Next as to the
money lent. It has been twice judicially determined * .* *
that the legislature meant only to void the security, not the
contract, in order to give courts an opportunity to examine
into the merits of the consideration. * * *" The above
view seems to be inconsistent with the view taken by the. Court
in Applegarth v. Colley.5 In that case Rolfe, B., in the opinion
of the Court, page 731, speaking of the Act of 1835, -said:
"That Act, while it repeals so much of the statute as makes the
securities void, expressly enacts that they shall have been
SPh.1T47 (184).

S and 6 Will, 4, c. 41.
'

W. BL 256.
1o M. &W. 722 (184).

NOTES

deemed to have been given on an illegal consideration; and it is
impossible to impute to the legislature an intention so absurd, as
that the consideration should be good and capable of being enforced, until some security is given for the amount, and then
that by the giving of the security the consideration should become bad.
We assume, therefore, with the defendant, that the Statute
of Anne, in connection with the 5 and 6 Will, 4 C. 41, must
be taken to avoid all contracts for the payment of money won
at play."
Kennedy, J., in his opinion in Saxby v. Fulton (ante), page
234, said, referring to two decisions, one of which was the case
above mentioned: "But those judgments related only to transactions within this country to which the Gaming Acts apply;
they cannot be conclusive authorities where the contract itself
and the giving of a security are alike legal in the country where
the contract was made."
Where the parties to the contract, though contracting abroad,
have by the terms of the contract or of the security indicated
that the law of England was intended to govern it, the English
courts have applied the Acts of 171o and 1835, aforesaid, and
held the security void, although the consideration for the security was legal in the country where the contract was made. For
an illustration of this principle see Moulis y. Owens,' where a
cheque was given in Algiers on an English bank, and this was
held sufficient to show that the parties contracted with reference to the English law.
Buckley, L. J., in Saxby v. Fulton (ante), at page 230, said:
"Moulis v. Owens affirmed thle view that the Statute of Anne
and the Act of I835 rendered a security given for a gaming
debt or for money lent for the purpose of gaming illegal and
void in the hands of the original holder wherever the gaming
might have taken place."
It should be noted, however, that in that case the Court
rested its decision upon the fact of the parties having shown
by the giving of a check on an English bank that they contracted with reference to the English law. Moulis v. Owens
would, therefore, not seem to be authority for the broad principle laid down by Buckley, L. J. There seems to be no reason
why the courts of England should not hold valid a security
given in a foreign country in pursuance of a contract entered
into in the foreign country, in which such security and contract were valid, and containing nothing from which it could
be inferred that the parties intended the law of England to
4L

R. r9o7, i K. B. 746.

94
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govern the transaction, even though the security would, if entered into in England, be invalid by the Gaming Act of 1835.
At the English Common Law the borrowing and lending of
money for the purpose of gaming was neither immoral or unlawful. Certain games have been made illegal in England by
statute, and money lent for the purpose of gaming and of playing with at an illegal game cannot be recovered back.? In
McKinncl v. Robinson, Lord Abinger, C. B., said, at page 44o:
"This principle is that the repayment of money, lent for the
express purpose of accomplishing an illegal object, cannot be
enforced. * * *"
In Quarrierv. Colstong it was decided that money won at
play, or lent for the purpose of gambling, in a country where
the games in question are not illegal might be recovered in the
courts of England. In Saxby v. Fulton9 this decision was treated
as binding on the court, but in Quarrier v. Colston it is expressly stated by the Chancellor that it does not appear what
the games were, or that they would have been illegal, even in
England,1 0 while in the principal case the money was lent by
plaintiff for gaming at roulette, a game which was illegal in
England."
The law in New York appears to be in accord with Saxby v.
Fulton. In Harris v. Whitc12 Folger, Ch. J., said: "If the
common law prevails in the other States in which by the contract the plaintiffs agreed to drive the defendant's horses, then
that contract was not illegal by the law of those States, and the
statute law of this State may not run over its borders into
those States and with it carry thither the public policy of this
State." (See also in the case of lotteries, Cons. of Ky. v. Bassford.12
The law of Massachusetts seems to be in accord with Saxby
v. Fulton." This decision (McIntyre v. Parks) has been severely criticized and limited, but upon another ground, " and
in a comparatively recent tase'" it is said never to have been
'3 M. & W. 4.4 (1838).
' I Ph. 147 (1842).
'Ante.
At p. 51.
Lasby v. Fulton (ante), p. 2=0.
n8t N. Y. 532, at *p.544.
"6 Hill (N. Y.). 526.
"Mclutyre v. Parkes (3 Metc. 207), 1841.
Webster v. Munger, 8 Gray, 584 (1857).
"Grames v. Johnson, i79 Mass., at p. 58.
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overruled."1 However, it has been held that a sale of intoxicating liquors in another State by one citizen of Massachusetts
to another with knowledge or reasonable cause to'believe that
they were to be resold by the purchaser in Massachusetts
against law and with a view to such resale will not support an
action for the price in Massachusetts."
It was likewise held
where the purpose of the sale was to violate the laws of
Maine.1'
In New Jersey contracts which are in violation of the New
Jersey statute against gaming will not be enforced, although
valid in the State where made."' For an interesting discussion
of the principles of this view of the law see the cases cited and
also the opinion of Magie, J., in Flagg v. Baldzwin.2 Some
American jurisdictions are in accord.1
The law in Pennsylvania seems to favor the English view
as laid down in Saxby v. Fulton, but the decisions on the subject
are not very satisfactory upon this point.2-

DAMAGES FOR DELAYED TELEGRAM AS AFFECTED"BY CONFLIcT

OF LAW.
The recent case of Western Union Telegraph Company v.
Hill' raises an interesting point on which the cases are in absolute conflict. A telegram was sent from Georgia to Alabama.
Through the negligence of the telegraph company, the delivery
was delayed, and the sendee brought action in Alabama for
breach of'contract, and claimed to recover damages for mental
anguish caused by the negligence. The law of Alabama allows
such damages, but that of Georgia does not. It was held that
the'law of Alabama governed the case.
Where a contract is made and performed in the same State, it
is well settled that matters relating to its execution, validity, or
interpretation are determined'by the law of that State. In
" Webster v. Munger (ante).
"Graves v. Johnson, 156 Mass. 214

(1892).

"Minzesheimer v. Doolittle, 6o N. J. Eq. 394 (i8f9).
Iri Stew. (38 N. J. Eq.), 219 (1884).
t
See cases cited in 2o Cyc. 924, n. 49; 24 Cent. Dig. cols. i532-4.
"Scott v. Duffy, 14 Pa. 18 (1849).
ISo Southern, 248 (Ala.).
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some jurisdictions this principle has been deemed sufficient to
2
justify a decision contra to the principal case on similar facts.
But the contract in the principal case was not wholly performed
in the State in which it was made. Where a contract is made
in one State and performed in another, the rule is that the intention of the parties to the contract detenmines the law applicable. To determine such intention, the subsidiary prima
facie rule has been adopted that the law of the place of performance governs. But the contract in the principal case may
be considered as partly performed in each State. Where a
contract is partly performed in the State in which it is made,
the weight of authority favors the view that the lex loci contraclus governs, notwithstanding the part performance in another State.3 But some jurisdictions have considered that the
delivery of the telegram is the performance contemplated by
the parties, and therefore have held that the law of the place
to which the telegram is sent governs the contract.' This
would seem to be the better view, if it is really a question of
intention.
The conclusion in the principal case was reached on an entirely different ground. The general rule in tort cases is that
the lex loci delicti governs the right of action, and the Court,
considering that the duty of a telegraph company to transmit
a telegram in due time is a public duty, held that the negligence
was as much a tort as a breach of contract, and, since the
breach occurred in Alabama, the law of that State was applied.
This ground seems very.unsatisfactory, because the action was
on the contract, and by the laws applicable to contracts, the
place where the breach occurred is immaterial.'
In Indiana, the penalty allowed by statute for the negligence
of a telegraph company cannot be recovered unless the telegram
was sent from Indiana,6 while in Tennessee, under a somewhat
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Waller, 74 S. W. 75r (Tex.);

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Woodard, 84 Ark. 323; Bryan V.
Western Union Telegraph Co. 133 N. C_ 6o3. 'Reed. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 66t; Bartlett v.
Collins, 1o9 Wis. 477; Htidson v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 92 Iowa, 231.
'Western Union TeL Co. v. Eubanks, zoo Ky. 59r ; North Packing
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co:, 70 Ill. App. 275; Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Blake, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 224 (this case is probably overruled by
later Texas cases, however).
' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Waller, 74 S. W. 751; Bryan v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 603; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Blake, 29
Tex. Civ. App. 224.
* Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hamilton, So Ind. 181; Carnahan v.

Western Union Tel. Co., 89 Ind. 526; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Reed,
96 Ind. ig.
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similar statute, recovery is allowed if the action is brought in
Tennessee. regardless of the locurs contractius.7
The relation of the le. fori to the measure of damages
tinder such circumstances is not discussed in the majority of
the cases, and yet this would seen to be the first point to be
determined. It is settled law that the le.r fori determines all
matters relating to the remedy. Does, then, the measure of
damages recoverable for the breach of a contract pertain to the
remedy merely, or is it an element of the substantive rights of
the litigants? Upon this point there is much confusion.
In Texas it has been held that the measure of damages pertains to the right and not to the remedy,' and thi3 view is fav0
ored by Wharton, 9 but opposed by 'Minor.1
The majority of
the cases cx contractnt are silent upon the subject: Where the
law of the forum is applied, it is because the foruth is also
the place of performance or the locits contractuts; and where
it is not applied, it is usually without mention of its relation to
the case.
In actions of tort the decisions are in conflict. The weight
of authority is perhaps in favor of the view that the measure
of damages is an element of the substantive rights of the parties
and therefore determined by the lkx loci delicti," but there
is considerable authority to the contrary."
Where interest is allowed, not under contract, but by way
of damages, the rule seems to be that the rate must be according to the ler f.ori. 3 On the other hand, the measure of damages recoverable from an indorser for the protest of a promissory note or hill of exchange is determined by the law of the
place where the contract of indorsement was made.14 But in
such case there seems a valid distinction. The indorsers of a
bill of exchange contract to guarantee its acceptance and paymnerit at the proper place, and, in default of such payment, they
'Gray v. Western Union Tel. Co., io8 Tenn. 39.
* Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co.. 25 Tex. Civ. App. 39&
* Wharton. Conflict of Laws, § 471 f, note 2.
"Minor. Conflict of Laws. § 20;,.
" Louisville Co. v. IVhitloze, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 193!; Hyde v. Wabash
etc., Ry. Co., 6r Iowa. 441.
" Evey v. R. R. Co.. s6 U. S. App. i18. 8 Fed. _-94; Higgins v. R. R.,
155 Mass. x76: Wooden v. R. R., 126 N. Y. io.
" Clark v. Child, 136 Mass. 344; Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wal. z23;
Carson v. Smith, T33 Mo. 6o6.
" Green v. Bond, 37 Tenn. 328; Allen v. Union Bantk, s Wharton
(Pa.), 420; Peck s,. Mayo, 14 Vt. 33. See also Roc v. Jerome, 18
Conn. 13&

NOTES

agree, upon due protest and notice, to reimburse the holder of
the note in principal and interest at the place where they entered into the contract. The damages are therefore a part of
the contract itself, and the lkx loci contractus is rightly applied.
Upon the whole, it is submitted that the better view is that
.he measure of damages is a matter of remedy merely. It has
nothing to do with the right of action, or its inherent elements
or character, and the wrong should be redressed in accordance
with the public policy of the forum.

LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT LIMITING TIE USE OF DEMISED
PREMISES AS AFFECTING A TENANT'S LIABILITY TO PAY

RENT.
A very nice legal question is often raised in determining
just what acts amount to such a deprivation of the use of premises by a tenant as to terminate the lease and work a suspension of the rent. A new phase of this question has been raised
by the passing of prohibition laws in several of the Southern
States, as is illustrated by the recent Alabama case of O'Byr'ne
v. Hcnley, So Southern, 83 (i9o9). There premises were let
"for saloon purposes," and some- time before the term of the
lease was expired the prohibition-law in question was passed,
whereupon the tenant claimed he was absolved from the payment of further rent, the premises being rendered unfit for the
purposes for which they were let. But the Court decided the
lease was not terminated so as to excuse the tenant,- reasoning
as follows: By Common Law, where leased premises are destroyed by fire, inevitable accident, etc., the tenant is not relieved from an express covenant to pay rent' unless the property is wholly destroyed, when the tenant is relieved from the
payment of rent. An example of such total destruction is
where apartments have been leased in a building which was destroyed by fire; the enjoyment of the space demised in air
has thus become impracticable. 2 With this as a basis the Court
goes on to argue that the destruction of business which by
the lease was to be carried on in the demised premises is, as to
the liability of the tenant to pay rent, analogous to the destruction of premises, and where the business is wholly destroyed
the liability to pay rent ceases, although under the facts in
'Cook v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99, 4 South, 713; Taylor on Landlord
and Tcnant, § 377.
'Shau-mut v. National Bank, 118 Mass. 125; Ain-worth v. Pitt, 38
CaL 8%
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question the prohibition law (lid not totally destroy the business, since the word "saloon" as used in the lease, while it included the sale of intoxicants, did not exclude the sale of other
things." Since there was only a partial destruction the conclusion was that the rent had to be paid for the whole term.
The final conclusion thus obtained is in accordance with the
eeneral trend of decisions that where the public authorities
restrict the use of leased premises that does not constitute a
sufficient excuse for the non-payment of rent,' as where city
authorities tear down a building and remove it as dangerous
and unlawful.5
However, the analog), drawn in the Alabama case has not
been the usual method of attacking the problem, for the usual
inquiry has been whether the acts complained of have amounted
to an eviction, which would operate to suspend the rent. A
Rhode Island' case, decided in 1898, well illustrates this line
of reasoning. There the lessee's license was taken away because of the erection of a public school within one hundred
feet of the premises, which by legislative enactment took away
the power of granting a license. The Court considered it only
in the light of an eviction, and decided there was none because
the act taking away the beneficial enjoyment of the premises was not that of the landlord or due to his procurement.
Where, however, the action of the public officer is due wholly
to the attitude of the landlord the rent is suspendedt when the
question of the presence or absence of an eviction is held to
be basic: as, where, when a place was rented for a distillery
the landlord refused to sign papers necessary to the granting
of the license-the lessor's own action caused the prevention
of the beneficial enjoyment by the public authorities. But the
mere fact that a lessor voted for a local option law under
which the lessee's license is taken away does not entitle the
lessee to terminate the lease.8 Nor does the fact that the
owner of premises leased them for saloon premises prevent him,
'Brezver Co. v. Boddie, i8i 111.
622; Goozen v. Phillips,49 Mich. 7.
' Taylor v. Finnigan, 189 Mass. s68: Miller v. Maguire, 18 R. L 7-o;
Kellog v. Love, 38 Wash. 293; Barghnman v. Portman, 14 S. W. 342
(Ky.): International Trust Co. v. Schuman, i58 Mass. 287; McLaren v.
Spaulding. 2 Cal. Sio; Chase v. Turner, 1o La. ig: Nicholls v. Byrne,
1i La. 170; Abodie v. Berges. 6 South, 529; Kerley v. Mayer, 31 N. Y.
Supp. 8M8; Gallup v. Albany. R. R. Co., 65 N. Y. r; l'crmilyon v. Austin,
2 F_ D. Smith, 303; Hitchcock v. Bacon, 118 Pa. 27"Hitchcock v. Bacon, 1i8 Pa. 272.
* Miller v. Maguire, 18 R_ I. 77.
SGrabhethorst v. Nicodcmuls, 42 M. 236.
'Barghman v. Porlman, T4 S. W. 342.
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as owner of other lots in the *same block, from protesting to
the city council against a renewal of the tenant's liquor license;
and the fact that such protest together with others made a
majority and prevented the city council from renewing the
license was held not sufficient to amount to a constructive eviction in a recent Washington case. 9
The last conclusion of the Court in the Alabama case, that
under the word "saloon" the premises could be used for other
lawful purposes besides the selling of liquor, has also been
applied to show there was no constructive eviction to justify a
suspension in the rent, in that the beneficial enjoyment of the
premises was not totally destroyed, which is essential to an
operative constructive eviction. 20 It is also interesting to note
that if the deprivation of beneficial enjoyment of the premises
results from an act done in the lawful exercise of the authority of the municipal coq)oration and in a proper manner, it is
immaterial that it was done by the landlord himself under a
statutory provision authorizing the owner in such a case to do
the work."'
A review of the authorities thus leads us to the conclusion
that whether the A ct of the legislature depriving the lessee of
the right to use the premises for the selling of liquor be considered from the. point of view of a constructive eviction or in
analogy to the total destruction of demised premises the conclusion is that it does not terminate the lease so as to suspend the
rent.
IS A CRIMINAL TRIAL ENDING nY DISCHARGE OF JURY, ON
FAILURE TO REACH VERDICT, A FORMER JEOPARDY?
In State v. Barnes,' a trial for murder, the jury were unable
to agree. On being brought into the court room, the foreman
stated that they wanited to know what punishment would be
meted out if their verdict should be "Not guilty by reason of
insanity." He also stited that they could not agree unless they
received this information. This information they were not
entitled to have. The Court, however, told them what the punishment would be, in that case, and then discharged them.
When the defendant was again placed on trial, he pleaded
"former jeopardy." The defence was not allowed.
Keltog v. Love, 38 Wash. 293.
Kerley v. Mayer, 3T N. Y. Supp. 8i&
"Gallup v. Albany R. R. Co., 65 N. Y. r.
1103 Pacific, 792 (Wash.).
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This brings up an interesting question on which, at one time,
there was much doubt and conflict of authority. It has been
said that anciently, in England, if the jurors could not come
to a verdict, before the end of the term, they were put in carts,
and hauled after the judges into the next county.2 It has been
held in some American courts that the evidence of time alone
can establish the jury's inability to agree during the term, and
that therefore if the jury is discharged after a short deliberation, on any other proofs, the prisoner cannot be tried again.2
At the present time, however, in most of the American
States, in England, and in Ireland, the judge may discharge
the jury when he is reasonably convinced that they cannot
agree, and the defendant may be tried again. This has been
decided in numerous cases, in one of which the deliberation of
the jury lasted only thirty minutes.' Many other cases hold
that the discharge of the jury is within the sound discretion of
the trial judge and will not be reviewed unless the discretion
was grossly abused.'
Other cases hold that a trial judge may discharge the jury
if he believes that they cannot agree, but must fully set out
on the record his reasons for so doing.' These decisions are
based on the principle that the record shows a prima facie
jeopardy, and should, therefore, also show matter negativing
it. This is the view considered correct by Bishop.'
The Pennsylvania decisions on this point are peculiar. The
Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "No person shall, for the
same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' In
Cominow',ealth v. Cook,' Tilghman, J. C., in a very elaborate
opinion, lays the foundation for the Pennsylvania decisions:
"When the jury are charged with the prisoner, his life is undoubtedly in jeopardy during their deliberation. If they are
divided in opinion, and especially if there should be a great
majority in favor of the prisoner, he has gained an advantage
of which he is deprived if the Court discharges the jury." He
further states that the mere fact that the jury say they cannot
'King v. Ledgingham, z Vent. 97.
*Er pare Vincent. 43 Ala. 402; Corn. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577;
Joscphine v. State, 39 Miss. 6:3.
"People v. Green, T3 Wend. 55; Slate v. Leach, :2o Ind. 124; x Russell
on Crimes, 6th Ed., 52 n.
'Hurley v. Slate, 6 Ohio, 399; Peoplev. Sheldon, r56 N. Y. 26&
"Ex parte Maxwell, ti Nev. 42&
'Bishop, New Criminal Law, 8th Ed., see. 1033 et seq.
'Art. x, sec. io.

"6 S. & R. 577.
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agree does not by any means prove that they cannot agree, and
is not sufficient cause for their discharge. In the case which
was being tried, the defendant's plea of "former jeopardy" was
upheld. In Coinionwealth v. Cluel° the jury was discharged
before verdict, and the defendant's plea of "former jeopardy"
was sustained.
In Commnonwealth v. McCreary" a plea of "former jeopardy" in a trial for burglary, the jury having been discharged
before verdict, was not allowed. But the Court expressly
stated that if it were a capital case, if the lives of the defendants were at stake, the discharge of a jury against defendant's
consent would be equivalent to an acquittal.
In Conmonwealth v. Fitcpatrick'2 the Court said: "* * *
Unless some overriding necessity arises after the jeopardy begins, the trial must proceed until it ends in a conviction or acquittal. In a capital case, therefore, a Court has no power to
discharge 2 jury without the defendant's consent, unless absolute necessity requires it. The mere inability of the jury to
agree within a few hours or days, is not such a necessity, nor
is the fact that the regular term is approaching its end, for the
courts have power to continue the term." In this case the plea
of "former jeopardy"--the-jury have been discharged before
verdict-was" sustained. This is a strong case, for the jury
were discharged only after having been out five days.
It'will be noticed that the Pennsylvania decisions are against
the weight of authority, only in capital cases. A few other
States also make this distinction. 3 Even in capital cases in
Pennsylvania, however, a defendant can be tried a second time,
after discharge of jury, where he has tampered with the jury,
or has contrived to keep back witnesses for the prosecution, or
when the prisoner becomes insane during the trial, or when a
juror dies. 1'
On a common sense interpretation of the jeopardy clause
which is found in substantially all the State constitutions, it
is submitted that the Pennsylvania cases, in the few instances
where the question has arisen, are wrong both in principle and
in expediency. The argument in favor of the Pennsylvania
view proves too much. The contention is: "The prisoner is in
jeopardy as soon as the jury is charged with the case." 5 Why
W3 Rawle, 4A8
Pa. 323.
" 121 Pa. iog, r L. R. A. 45!.
= State v. Bullock, 63 N. C. 570.
"Com. v. fcCrcary, 9 Pa. 323.
Com v. Cook, 6 S.& RL 577.
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stop at that point? Why not say he is in jeopardy as soon
as the first accusation is made, and if that accusation is
dropped and the person is afterward accused, let him plead
"former jeopardy?" The defendant has not been actually in
jeopardy until the trial has proceeded to completion, either to an
acquittal or conviction. In administering justice, it is essential
to have some limit, in point of time, to the deliberation of a
jury. Most of the jurisdictions have placed the matter entirely
in the discretion of the trial judge, making the same subject
to review only where there is a gross abuse of discretion. That
seems to be the proper way of treating the subject. The defendant will not be subjected to an indefinite number of trials
in any event, because the custom has been, if there are two
mistrials, to dismiss the defendant, even in murder trials, on
bail, and not try him a third time.

